The use of meta-rules in logic, i.e., rules whose content includes other rules, has recently gained attention in the setting of non-monotonic reasoning: a first logical formalisation and efficient algorithms to compute the (meta)-extensions of such theories were proposed in Olivieri et al (2021) This work extends such a logical framework by considering the deontic aspect. The resulting logic will not just be able to model policies but also tackle well-known aspects that occur in numerous legal systems. The use of Defeasible Logic (DL) to model meta-rules in the application area we just alluded to has been investigated. Within this line of research, the study mentioned above was not focusing on the general computational properties of meta-rules. This study fills this gap with two major contributions. First, we introduce and formalise two variants of Defeasible Deontic Logic with Meta-Rules to represent (1) defeasible meta-theories with deontic modalities, and (2) two different types of conflicts among rules: Simple Conflict Defeasible Deontic Logic, and Cautious Conflict Defeasible Deontic Logic. Second, we advance efficient algorithms to compute the extensions for both variants.

Defeasible rules are used in providing computable representations of legal documents and, more recently, have been suggested as a basis for explainable AI. Such applications draw attention to the scalability of implementations. The defeasible logic $DL(\partial_{||})$ was introduced as a more scalable alternative to $DL(\partial)$, which is better known. In this paper we consider the use of (implementations of) $DL(\partial_{||})$ as a computational aid to computing conclusions in $DL(\partial)$ and other defeasible logics, rather than as an alternative to $DL(\partial)$. We identify conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be substituted for $DL(\partial)$ with no change to the conclusions drawn, and conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be used to draw some valid conclusions, leaving the remainder to be drawn by $DL(\partial)$.

(Maher 2012) introduced an approach for relative expressiveness of defeasible logics, and two notions of relative expressiveness were investigated. Using the first of these definitions of relative expressiveness, we show that all the defeasible logics in the DL framework are equally expressive under this formulation of relative expressiveness. The second formulation of relative expressiveness is stronger than the first. However, we show that logics incorporating individual defeat are equally expressive as the corresponding logics with team defeat. Thus the only differences in expressiveness of logics in DL arise from differences in how ambiguity is handled. This completes the study of relative expressiveness in DL begun in \cite{Maher12}.

The paper proposes a fresh look at the concept of goal and advances that motivational attitudes like desire, goal and intention are just facets of the broader notion of (acceptable) outcome. We propose to encode the preferences of an agent as sequences of "alternative acceptable outcomes". We then study how the agent's beliefs and norms can be used to filter the mental attitudes out of the sequences of alternative acceptable outcomes. Finally, we formalise such intuitions in a novel Modal Defeasible Logic and we prove that the resulting formalisation is computationally feasible.

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity. The concept of permission plays an important role in many normative domains in that it may be crucial in characterising notions such as those of authorisation and derogation [11,30,33]. For example, sometimes it may happen that we mistakenly drive to a building site, or a roadwork restricted area, with signs out saying "No admittance.

There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a priority between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts. One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is the sceptical one known as Defeasible Logic. In Defeasible Logic the tool used for conflict resolution is a preference relation between rules, that establishes the priority among them. In this paper we investigate how to modify such a preference relation in a defeasible logic theory in order to change the conclusions of the theory itself. We argue that the approach we adopt is applicable to legal reasoning where users, in general, cannot change facts or rules, but can propose their preferences about the relative strength of the rules. We provide a comprehensive study of the possible combinatorial cases and we identify and analyse the cases where the revision process is successful. After this analysis, we identify three revision/update operators and study them against the AGM postulates for belief revision operators, to discover that only a part of these postulates are satisfied by the three operators.

We address the relative expressiveness of defeasible logics in the framework DL. Relative expressiveness is formulated as the ability to simulate the reasoning of one logic within another logic. We show that such simulations must be modular, in the sense that they also work if applied only to part of a theory, in order to achieve a useful notion of relative expressiveness. We present simulations showing that logics in DL with and without the capability of team defeat are equally expressive. We also show that logics that handle ambiguity differently -- ambiguity blocking versus ambiguity propagating -- have distinct expressiveness, with neither able to simulate the other under a different formulation of expressiveness.

Normal forms play an important role in computer science. Examples of areas where normal forms have proved fruitful include logic, where normal forms of formulae are used both for the proof of theoretical results and in automated theorem proving, and relational databases [7], where normal forms have been the driving force in the development of database theory and principles of good data modelling. In computer science, usually normal forms are supported by transformations, operational procedures that transform initial objects (such as programs or logical theories) to their normal form. Such transformations are important for two main reasons: 1. They support the understanding and assimilation of new concepts because they allow one to concentrate on certain forms and key features only. Thus transformations can be useful as theoretical tools.